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ST. JOHNS LAW REVIEW
Perhaps, as acknowledged by Judge Friendly, "it would be wiser
for Congress to allow the FTC to impose penalties for violations of
its orders, subject to limited judicial review," 67 but Congress has not
yet seen fit to do so. Where Congress has designated the district court
as the forum for adjudicating violations of FTC orders and for im-
posing the consequent civil penalties, "it must preserve to the parties
their right to jury trial."68 Thus, Judge Friendly's majority opinion
in Williams strikes a proper accord between the seventh amendment
and the Federal Trade Commission Act as currently written.
Christopher R. Belmonte
FDA DIETARY SUPPLEMENT REGULATIONS
National Nutritional Foods Association v. FDA
Section 4011 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act2 empowers the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to promulgate a "reasonable
definition and standard of identity" for any food under its "common or
usual name" when such action "will promote honesty and fair dealing
in the interest of consumers." 3 When first proposed, the section was
viewed as a tool to protect consumers against cheapened products.4
Identity standards for particular foods, such as a requirement that pea-
nut butter consist of 90 percent peanuts, have been utilized to guar-
antee the sale of products conforming to an established minimum
standard of quality.5 The Second Circuit, in National Nutritional
67 498 F.2d at 430.
68 Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 383 (1974) (citation omitted).
As was probably realized by Judge Oakes, see 498 F.2d at 441 n.8, the majority
holding places the vindication of the Sixth Circuit's parallel enforcing order in the hands
of a jury. See text accompanying note 3 supra. Such a result is, however, a necessary
corollary to a statutory scheme which provides for the alternative remedy of a civil
penalty to be adjudicated in district court. Indeed, a jury dearly would be required to
vindicate a circuit court's parallel enforcing order in the event a criminal proceeding is
brought under 15 U.S.C. § 54 (1970), see note 5 supra, where the sixth amendment right
to trial by jury would be applicable.
121 U.S.C. § 341 (1970).
2 Id. § 301 et seq.
3 Id. § 341.
4 27 C. DUNN, FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND Cosamrio Ac 1073 (1938) [hereinafter cited
as DUNN]. During legislative hearings, illustrations of cheapened foods included: (1) butter
to which water was added to reduce fat content, id. at 218; (2) oysters to which water
was added, id. at 161; (3) jams and preserves in which a higher percentage of sugar than
fruit was used, id. at 819.
5 See, e.g., Corn Prods. Co. v. HEW, 427 F.2d 511 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957
(1970) (sustaining a peanut butter standard of identity requiring a minimum of 90% pea-
nut content); Columbia Cheese Co. v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 777 (1944) (upholding a cream cheese standard of at least 33% milk fat).
For an explanation of the purpose of § 401 as a means of setting a minimum standard
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Foods Association v. FDA, confirmed the FDA's authority to promul-
gate a standard of identity for the entire class of dietary supplements.7
Moreover, the court upheld the unprecedented use of section 401 as a
means of prohibiting the marketing of many dietary supplements con-
taining ingredients which, though harmless, mislead the consumer as to
the actual nutritional benefits he will derive.s
In Nutritional Foods, the FDA regulations under review required
that dietary supplements be marketed only in narrowly prescribed
combinations of vitamins and minerals.9 Mandatory and optional
for food products, see Austin, The Federal Food Legislation of 1938 and the Food Indus-
try, 6 LAw & CONTEmiP. PROB. 127, 132 (1939) and Baldwin & Kirlin, Consumers Appraise
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 144, 146 (1939). A summary
of the standards that have been promulgated under § 401 may be found in Comment,
The Federal Food Drug and Cosmetic Act as an Experiment in Quality Control, 20 SYRA-
cusE L. REv. 883 (1969).
6 504 F.2d 761 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3465 (Feb. 25, 1975).
7 504 F.2d at 774-77. Dietary supplements include vitamins and/or minerals which
are prepared and offered as tablets, capsules, wafers, or other similar uniform
units; in powder, granular, flake, or liquid form; or in the physical form of
conventional foods; and purport to be or are represented for special dietary use
by man to supplement his diet by increasing the total dietary intake of one or
more of the essential vitamins and/or minerals specified in paragraph (f) of this
section.
21 C.F.R. § 80.1(a) (1974).
8 504 F.2d at 781. An assumption underlying the regulations is the high degree of
consumer ignorance in the area of sound nutrition. See Findings of Fact 8, 11, & 22,
38 Fed. Reg. 20,734-55 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Findings of Fact]. The FDA found that
[a]lthough approximately 20 percent of the users of dietary supplements of vita-
mins and minerals actually use those articles to supplement or balance their diet,
more than 40 percent of those persons admit they have no idea which vitamins
or minerals, if any, are not sufficiently supplied by their diet.
Id., 9 at 20,735.
9 The regulations provide:
(1) A dietary supplemet... shal be offered ... only in the following combi-
nations ... (i) All vitamins and minerals. (ii) All vitamins. (iii) All minerals.
(iv) All vitamins and the mineral iron. ...
(2) A dietary supplement may also be composed of any single vitamin or mineral
ar p ( of this section.
21 C.F.R. § 80.I(b)(1)(2) (1974). Fortified foods are also covered by the standard if:(1) more than 50% of a nutrient's adult RDA has been added;
(2) the addition is not just a replacement for nutrients lost in processing;
(3) the product is represented for special dietary purposes.
Id. §§ 80.1(b)(5), 80.1(e)(5), 80.1(e)(7). A fortified food is one to which a vitamin and/or
mineral is added to increase its nutritional value.
Testimony at hearings prior to the promulgation of the regulation had shown that 59
different multivitamin and/or multimineral tablets were available for sale. The number
of ingredients contained in each type of supplement ranged from 9 to 57. An example
of the wide range of potencies was vitamin C. "The dosage per tablet or capsule of
vitamin C . . .ranged from 30 to 500 rag." National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA,
504 F.2d 761, 776 (2d Cir. 1974).
Consideration of the proposals spanned more than a decade. The original notice to
revise the dietary supplement regulations was published in 1962. 27 Fed. Reg. 5815 (1962).
The regulations were finally promulgated on August 2, 1973, with an effective date of
January 1, 1975. 38 Fed. Reg. 20,708-18, 20,730-40 (1973). The evidentiary hearings them-
selves lasted 22 months and produced over 32,000 pages of testimony. National Nutritional
Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1974).
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nutrients, each within a specified dosage range, were designated for each
combination.10 As its quantitative standard, the FDA adopted the
schedule of Recommended Daily Allowances (RDA)" of the National
Academy of Sciences and required that the nutrients contained in most
dietary supplements be within 50 to 150 percent of their RDA.12 Barred
from all combinations were ingredients devoid of nutritional value, 13
as well as valuable nutrients for which no RDA had yet been estab-
lished.14 Nonconforming supplements would be deemed misbranded'
and hence could be seized' 6 and their producers held criminally liable.17
Combinations containing a nutrient in excess of 150 percent of its RDA
were classified as drugs,' 8 and thus, were subject to more stringent
standards required of new drugs. 19
For an account of the lengthy hearing procedures, see Hamilton, Rulemaking on a
Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEXAs L. REv. 1132, 1145-51 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Hamilton].
10 Included in the list were ten mandatory and three optional vitamins, and five
mandatory and three optional minerals. 21 C.F.R. § 80.1(f)() (1974).
lId. § 80.1()(2). The RDA replaces the Minimum Daily Requirements (MDR) as
the nutritional yardstick. The RDA's indicate what would be an adequate nutritional
level for between 95 to 99% of the normal healthy population. Findings of Fact 18,
supra note 8, at 20,735.
Under the previous regulations, the MDR served only a labeling function, viz., in
the case of certain vitamins and minerals the percentage of the nutrient's MDR had to
be disclosed on the label. 504 F.2d at 769. The RDA's, however, also serve as the basis
for the standard of identity.
12 504 F.2d at 791. Under the FDA standard, for example, the dosage range of vita-
min B6 for adults was one to three mg.; for vitamin E, 15 to 45 units; for vitamin C, 30
to 90 mg. 21 C.F.R. § 80.1(f)(1) (1974). Vitamins A and D were limited to 100% of their
RDA since higher quantities were deemed toxic. Findings of Fact 20, supra note 8,
at 20,735.
1321 U.S.C. § 125.2(b)(5) (1974).
It was felt that the longer the list of ingredients, the greater the nutritional value
the consumer thinks he is getting and the more likely he is to buy the product. Findings
of Fact 32, supra note 8, at 20,736. See United States v. An Article of Food ... Nuclomin,
482 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1973) (listing of non-nutritional ingredients on a dietary supplement
is inherently misleading); see notes 66-68 and accompanying text infra.
Nonessential ingredients could be marketed so long as no nutritional claims were
made and the label bore a statement to the effect that their value had not been estab-
lished. Conclusion of Law B with respect to § 125.2, 38 Fed. Reg. 20,716 (1973).
14 21 C.F.R. § 125.1(c) (1974).
15 A food is deemed misbranded under § 403(g) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
[i]f it purports to be or is represented as a food for which a definition and stan-
ard of identity has been prescribed ... unless (1) it conforms to such definition
and standard, and (2) its label bears the name of the food specified in the defini-
tion and standard ....
21 U.S.C. § 343(g) (1970).
16 Id. § 334(a).
17 Misbranding is a misdemeanor. Id. § 333(a).
1821 C.F.R. § 125.1(h) (1974).
19 A significant effect of such a designation is that the manufacturer must prove the
efficacy and safety of his product. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1970).
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The thrust behind the FDA's regulations was not that the dietary
supplements failed to contain the nutrients represented on, the label
or nutrients in adequate quantities, but rather, that the many products
on the market were nutritionally "irrational" and tended to mislead
the public.2 0 Accordingly, it was deemed appropriate to establish max-
imum as well as minimum dosages for dietary supplements, even though
amounts above the maxima are generally harmless.2 1 Those consumers
desiring a nutrient in excess of its RDA could, of course, consume
additional tablets22 or purchase individual vitamin and mineral sup-
plements in order to compose their own combinations.23
A number of parties adversely affected by the FDA's actions,
including manufacturers and consumers of dietary supplements, peti-
tioned the Second Circuit for review of the final regulations promul-
gated.24 After disposing of the jurisdictional question presented,25 the
court focused its attention on whether section 401 empowers the FDA
to establish a quantitative standard of identity for dietary supplements.
20 Findings of Fact 8, 11, & 12, supra note 8, at 20,734-35. The agency found that
the promulgation of a standard of identity would reduce consumer confusion concerning
the choice of dietary supplements by insuring that a "basically rational formula for all
products" be adopted. Id. 3, supra note 8, at 20,734.
21 See generally Letter from Peter Hutt, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Food and Drug Div.,
to Senator Gaylord Nelson et a[., reprinted in 119 Cong. Rec. 13,215-20 (daily ed. July 12,
1973), for an explanation and defense of the regulations.
22 504 F.2d at 783. For example, to get 500 mg. of vitamin C, one would have to
take six 90 mg. tablets.
23 The court conceded that, because of the greater per unit cost of lower dosages, it
would likely cost the consumer more to achieve the precise combination or dosage he
wishes than it now costs him without a standard of identity. Id. at 782-83.
24 A petition to review a final FDA regulation promulgated under §§ 401 or 4030)
may be brought directly to-a court of appeals where the petitioner resides or where his
principal place of business is located. 21 U.S.C. § 371(f) (1970). Petitions filed in the Ninth
Circuit and the District of Columbia Circuit were transferred and consolidated with
those originally filed in the Second Circuit. 504 F.2d at 767 n.l.
The present case is just one instance of the persistent opposition to the FDA's regu-
lations by some of the petitioners. In National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 491 F.2d
1141 (2d Cir. 1974), the same regulations were challenged on the basis of a procedural
irregularity. The petitioners alleged bad faith on the Commissioner's part and charged
that he had failed to review exceptions to the regulations or to examine the whole record
before signing the administrative orders. Despite the short tenure of the newly appointed
Commissioner, the Second Circuit held that there had not been a sufficient showing that
he failed to consider the record adequately. Id. at 1146.
25 The issue was whether the court had jurisdiction to review those regulations which
petitioners contended were not promulgated in pursuance to §§ 401 and 403(j). See note
24 supra. The court held that all but one provision arguably rested in whole or in part
on these statutory sections. 504 F.2d at 773. Consequently, even if the court were ulti-
mately to reject the Government's argument as to the authority to promulgate the regu-
lations under these sections, the court was still bound to decide the case as required by
statute. Id. at 772. Furthermore, since the remaining provision was part of a comprehen-
sive set of regulations, the court by analogy to pendent jurisdiction and, in the interest
of conserving judicial time, could review it as well. Id. at 773.
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At the outset, the Second Circuit rejected the contention that section
403(j),26 which specifically requires full disclosure on the label of the
value of ingredients in supplements, precludes the application of sec-
tion 401 to dietary supplements. 27 In the court's view, section 4030)
represented one method, but by no means the exclusive method, of
consumer protection with respect to vitamin and mineral supplements.2
Further, it was reasonable for the FDA to conclude that truthful label-
ing would not alone provide adequate protection.29 Thus, section 4030)
did not act as a bar to the use of section 401 in this instance.
Petitioners also contended that the FDA had exceeded its authority
in fixing a standard for "dietary supplements" since such terminology
denoted an entire class of foods and not a "common or usual name"
of a specific food.80 Judge Friendly, writing for the court, rejected this
argument, noting that the section provides that a standard of identity
shall be prescribed "under its common or usual name so far as prac-
ticable."8' Based solely on this statutory language, the court felt that
Congress had intended the section to be applicable to "a food or a
class of foods under something other than its common or usual name."32
26 Pursuant to § 403(j), food is misbranded
[i]f it purports to be or is represented for special dietary uses, unless its label
bears such information concerning its vitamin, mineral, and other dietary prop-
erties as the Secretary determines to be .. .necessary in order fully to inform
purchasers as to its value for such uses.
21 U.S.C. § 3430) (1970).
27 504 F.2d at 774-75.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 777. In addition to the standard of identity, the FDA regulations included
two basic labeling provisions. The label was to indicate the percentage of U.S. RDA for
each nutrient. 21 C.F.R. § 125.3(a) (1974). Also, specific statements concerning the efficacy
of the various ingredients and the quality of the American diet were disallowed. The
labeling could not claim or imply that: (1) the dietary supplement could effectively pre-
vent or cure any disease or symptom; (2) ordinary foods cannot supply sufficient amounts
of nutrients; (3) the soil in which food is grown may reduce the nutritional quality of
a food; (4) storage, transportation, processing, or cooking of foods may be responsible for
nutritional deficiency; (5) certain foods not shown to be essential to human nutrition have
nutritional benefit; and (6) natural vitamins are superior to added or synthetic ones. Id.
§ 125.2(b)(1)-(6).
The court concluded that labeling provisions alone might be inadequate in eliminat-
ing consumer confusion since
[t]he subject matter is simply too recondite and the offerings of products too di-
verse for a label alone to be "dear enough so that, in the words of the prophet
Isaiah, 'wayfaring men, though fools, shall not err therein' ...."
504 F.2d at 777, quoting General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940).
30 Petitioners compared dietary supplements to the broad category of cheese, and a
specific vitamin to a particular type of cheese. It was argued that while the FDA may
have authority to establish a standard for vitamin A, just as it would for Swiss cheese,
it could not establish one for dietary supplements as a class any more than it could for
cheese as a class. Brief for Petitioner Nutritional Foods Ass'n at 15.
81504 F.2d at 779, quoting 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1970) (emphasis added by the court).
21Id. Under § 401, the FDA in "prescribing a definition and standard of identity for
any food or class of food in which optional ingredients are permitted" shall "designate
[Vol. 49:225
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Furthermore, it reasoned that despite the variation among competing
products, the term "dietary supplement" has become "common and
usual" for the total range of products.83 A product composed of nu-
trients, by its very nature, "purports to be" a "dietary supplement,"
thereby making standardization possible.34
Having determined that the FDA had the authority to promulgate
a standard of identity for dietary supplements, the court next considered
whether the regulation could extend so far as to effectively ban whole-
some, safe, and accurately labeled products from the marketplace.35
Petitioners alleged that such an effect would violate the congressional
intent underlying section 401.36 To support their contentions, they
noted that both the Senate37 and House33 reports indicated that whole-
some, yet substandard or nonconforming products, could be marketed,
albeit under a different name. Responding to these arguments, the
court ruled that section 401 was not merely adopted to guard against
unwholesomeness, 89 but was also designed to "promote honesty and
fair dealing in the interest of the consumer."40 As Judge Friendly noted:
Advertising a potency in excess of the upper limits is bound to
make consumers think they are getting a superior product when,
the optional ingredients which shall be named on the label .... " 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1970)
(emphasis added). The Government reasoned that if the FDA has the power to require
the listing of optional ingredients on a label of a standardized class of foods, it must also
have the authority to promulgate a standard for such class. Brief for Respondent at 24.
In Senate reports on the scope of § 401, examples of foods that would be subject to
standardization included "edible oils," S. REP. No. 493, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), and
"spices," S. REP. No. 361, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935), both being classes of food. See DUNN,
supra note 4, at 119, 246.
33 504 F.2d at 779.
34 Id. at 780.
35 Under the regulations, common products, such as vitamin B complex and vitamin
C in a dosage exceeding 90 rg., could not be sold.
36 See Brief for Petitioner, Archon Pure Prods. Corp. at 24-26; Brief for Petitioner,
National Nutritional Foods Ass'n at 17-18.
37 The Senate Committee Report on S.5, an intermediate version of the 1938 Act,
stated:
It should be noted that the operation of this provision [§ 401] will in no way
interfere with the marketing of any food which is wholesome but which does
not meet the definition or standard, or for which no definition and standard has
been provided; but if an article is sold under a name for which a definition and
standard has been provided, it must conform to the regulation.
S. REP. No. 361, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), in DUNN, supra note 4, at 246.
38 The House report read:
Under this a single reasonable standard of quality can be prescribed for any food
and if the product falls below this standard it must be labeled as substandard
[but can still be marketed].
H.R. REP. No. 2139, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 5 (1938), in DUNN, supra note 4, at 819.
39 It should be noted that the legislative comments were directed at the proper iden-
tification of cheapened products and did not contemplate a situation where the plethora
of products itself would confuse and mislead the purchasing public. Id. at 781.
40 504 F.2d at 782.
1975]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in the FDA's view, they are not; furthermore . . . the problem
would not be fully obviated by prescribing a label statement that
the potencies exceeded the RDA's by particular amounts.41
Although conceding that accurate labeling would sufficiently protect
the sophisticated purchaser,42 the court found it "far from irrational"
for the agency to determine that such labeling would not safeguard
the ordinary buyer.43 Judge Friendly further commented that striking
a proper balance among the interests of these consumers lay with the
agency, not the reviewing court.44
In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit relied principally upon
the Supreme Court decision in Federal Security Administrator v.
Quaker Oats Co.45 For ten years, Quaker Oats had been marketing a
product labeled "farina enriched with vitamin D." Subsequently, the
standard of identity established for farina excluded vitamin D, though
the vitamin could be included as an optional ingredient in "enriched
farina. '46 In effect, Quaker Oats could not market its product as
"farina," since it included an additional ingredient; nor could it
market it as "enriched farina," since it did not contain all the nutrients
required for the enriched product. 47 In sustaining the standard, the
Court stated:
The statutory purpose to fix a definition of identity of an article
of food sold under its common or usual name would be defeated
if producers were free to add ingredients, however wholesome,
which are not within the definition .... 48
Furthermore, the Court noted the FDA's wide discretion in determin-
ing what ingredients should be included, concluding that the existence
of reasonable alternatives would not constitute a valid objection to
agency action.4
9
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45318 U.S. 218 (1943).
46 Id. at 220.
47 Id. at 224.
48 Id. at 232, cited in National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 778
(1974).
Chief Justice Stone stated that the FDA was justified in so protecting consumers:
Mhe evidence of the desire of consumers to purchase vitamin enriched foods,
their general ignorance of the composition and value of the vitamin content of
those foods, and their consequent inability to guard against the purchase of prod-
ucts of inferior or unsuitable vitamin content sufficiently supports the Adminis-
trator's conclusions ... [that, in the absence of appropriate standards of identity,
consumer confusion would ensue].
Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 229 (1943).
49 318 U.S. at 233.
The Second Circuit also relied on two appellate decisions: United States v. 20 Cases
[Vol. 49:225
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In accepting Quaker Oats as controlling, Judge Friendly refused
to view 62 Cases of Jam v. United States50 as a retreat from the broad
scope previously enunciated.5 1 In 62 Cases of Jam the Supreme Court
held that if properly labeled an imitation, a product resembling jam
but containing less fruit than standardized jam was not misbranded. 2
The Second Circuit discerned that 62 Cases of Jam does not preclude
the use of section 401 to ban a wholesome product from the market.
It holds only that a properly labeled imitation can be sold since it does
not purport to be the standardized product, a view unchallenged in
Nutritional Foods.53
The court next considered whether the particular standard pro-
mulgated by the FDA was reasonable,5 4 concluding that the agency had
failed to establish the reasonableness of some aspects.P5 The FDA was
directed to consider applications for permitting vitamin B complex
. .. "Buitoni 20% Protein Spaghetti," 228 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1956), aff'g on opinion below,
130 F. Supp. 715 (D. Del. 1954); Libby, McNeill & Libby v. United States, 148 F.2d 71
(2d Cir. 1945), af'g sub noma. United States v. 306 Cases . . . Tomato Catsup With Pre-
servative, 55 F. Supp. 725 (E.D.N.Y. 1944). The manufacturers in both cases contended
that their products had independent identities from the food being standardized; thus,
their products did not have to conform to the standards. The additional nonconforming
ingredient in each respective product was safe. Nevertheless, it was held that the com-
panies had to reformulate their products if they were to be sold as spaghetti and catsup,
respectively. 130 F. Supp. at 720; 148 F.2d at 72-73.
50340 U.S. 593 (1951).
51504 F.2d at 778-79.
52 340 U.S. at 600-01. Under § 403(c) of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, a food is
deemed misbranded
[if it is an imitation of another food, unless its label bears, in type of uniform
size and prominence, the word "imitation" and, immediately thereafter, the name
of the food imitated.
21 U.S.C. § 343(c) (1970).
53 504 F.2d at 778-79. See United States v. 856 Cases . . . Demi, 254 F. Supp. 57
(N.D.N.Y. 1966), wherein the court rejected the Government's attempt to condemn, as
misbranded, an imitation margarine that did not meet the standard of identity for mar-
garine. But cf. United States v. 30 Cases ... Leader Brand Strawberry Fruit Spread, 93
F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950) where a product resembling jam but labeled a fruit spread,
was deemed mislabeled for not meeting the standard promulgated for jam.
The Second Circuit noted, however, that the possibility of marketing imitation di-
etary supplements to avoid the impact of §§ 401 and 403 is a totally unrealistic alterna-
tive for manufacturers. As the court recognized, use of the word "imitation" would be
"commercial death in an industry where naturalness is next to godliness." 504 F.2d at
779 n.18.
54 In considering reasonableness, the court was guided by the rule that administrative
findings "as to facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 21 U.S.C.
§ 371(f)(3) (1970). Substantiality is determined in light of the total record. Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker
Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218 (1943).
5r 504 F.2d at 792. Petitioners had strenuously objected to the use of the RDA's as
the standard establishing the maximum dosages. It was argued that the RDA's only rep-
resented an adequate standard for 95-99% of the healthy population. Id. at 791.
As the court noted, quantitative limits were essential to carry out the purposes of the
standardization. Id. at 790. Despite conflicting expert testimony, the court did not view
the adoption of RDA's as the maximum standard unreasonable per se. Id. at 792,
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supplements and vitamin C in larger dosages than originally proposed.5 6
For this purpose, the court stayed the enforcement of the regulations
until June 30, 1975, or until six months after the judgments become
final, whichever is later.57 In addition to reviewing such applications,
the agency was directed to reopen the record to allow for the reasonable
cross-examination of a key witness on the validity of adopting the Na-
tional Academy of Sciences' RDA as the standard for maximum dos-
ages.58
The court also held that the FDA did not have the authority to
classify dietary supplements exceeding the maximum limits as drugs, 9
or to ban from the standard, essential ingredients for which no RDA
had been established.60 Furthermore, though the regulations provided
for revisions in accord with changes in nutritional knowledge,61 the
upper limits were to be responsive solely to changes in the RDA. The
court held that future revisions should not be so restricted. Instead,
the maxima should be based on whether the limit promotes "honesty
and fair dealing," by balancing the freedom infringed with the confu-
sion that may be created by increasing the maxima.6 2
56 ld. at 785. The court-directed method for evaluating the application was to bal-
ance the potential increase in confusion caused by an increased variety of nutrients on
the market against such factors as: (1) the consumer demand for the product and the
degree to which nutritional experts believe that the product is not irrational for a sub-
stantial number of persons; (2) the extent to which labeling alone would reduce consumer
confusion; (3) the dependability of the National Academy of Sciences' RDA for the
particular nutrient at issue. Id. at 785-86.
57 Id. at 785.
58 Id. at 798-99. In an attempt to limit friendly cross-examination, the hearing exam-
iner had ruled that since the witness involved was opposed to part of the regulations, he
could not be cross-examined by other opponents. The witness had been instrumental in
the formulation of the RDA's. The Second Circuit noted that the validity of the RDA's
was a central issue and observed that the National Health Federation, which requested
the cross-examination, and the American Medical Association, which had called the wit-
ness, did not have common interests. Id. at 795-99. See Hamilton, supra note 9, at 1167-70,
generally supporting the examiner's effort to limit friendly cross-examination.
59 504 F.2d at 789. The FDA had argued that there was no normal nutritional need
for nutrients in quantities in excess of 150% of their RDA. Therefore, such amounts
could only serve a therapeutic purpose. The court noted, however, that a significant
number of people have a nutritional need for potencies exceeding the upper limits. "In
light of this, it cannot be said even as an objective matter that a given bottle of pills,
each containing more than the upper limit of one or more nutrients, is not being used
for nutritional purposes." Id.
Furthermore, the court noted that the seller's intent is a critical element in defining
a drug. While objective evidence may "pierce" a "manufacturer's subjective claims of
intent," more evidence than the uselessness of potencies in excess of the upper limits is
required. Id.
60 Id. at 786-87. The court concluded that it was unreasonable to allow the separate
sale of nonessential ingredients and yet ban the sale of dietary supplements not on the
approved list of vitamins and minerals. Further, "the failure of the FDA, after twelve
years of proceedings, to fix U.S. RDA's for . . . [these nutrients] cannot in itself render
the provision 'reasonable'." Id.
6121 CX.FR § 80.l(b)(4) (1974).
62 504 F.2d at 784-85. Of the labeling provisions, see note 29 supra, all were sustained
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In view of the unique character of dietary supplements and the
broad scope of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,63 Nutritional Foods
represents a proper expansion of the scope of section 401. Quaker Oats
required only that a product represented as the standardized food meet
that standard. In contrast, pursuant to the FDA's dietary supplement
regulations, a food offered to increase a person's dietary intake of one
or more essential nutrients is deemed a dietary supplement and must
therefore conform to the standard regardless of the representations
made on the label. 4 As the court reasoned, to allow the continued mar-
keting of nonconforming combinations or dosages by avoidance of the
term "dietary supplement" would, in this instance, undermine the
purpose of section 401.65
Other circuits confronting the problem of consumer ignorance in
the nutrition field have also paid deference to the FDA's contentions.
In United States v. An Article of Food... Nuclomin,66 a dietary sup-
plement was marketed which included ingredients that were not essen-
tial to nutrition. The label itself stated that no need for these ingre-
dients had been established.6 7 Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit held
that the listing of such ingredients misrepresented the product's nutri-
tional value and that accurate labeling information could not compen-
sate for the inherent misrepresentation." Further, in United States v.
Vitasafe Co.,"9 the Third Circuit held that a product which listed non-
except the section prohibiting the implication that a balanced diet cannot supply ade-
quate amounts of nutrients. The court found that women of child-bearing age and chil-
dren were more likely to need iron supplements than the average adult male. As to these
persons, an otherwise balanced diet would not supply the needed nutrients. Thus, the
court held that the FDA had to either produce more cogent evidence to support its label-
ing requirement or revise the section. 504 F.2d at 802, 806.
63 In rendering its decision, the Second Circuit was guided by the principles enunci-
ated in United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), wherein it was stated:
The purposes of this legislation [Food and Drugs Act of 1906; Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act of 1938] thus touch phases of the lives and health of people which,
in the circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.
Regard for these purposes should infuse construction of the legislation if it is to
be treated as a working instrument of government and not merely as a collection
of English words.
Id. at 280, cited in National Nutritional Foods Ass'n v. FDA, 504 F.2d 761, 774 (2d Cir.
1974).
64 504 F.2d at 781. See United States v. 30 Cases ... Leader Brand Strawberry Spread,
93 F. Supp. 764 (S.D. Iowa 1950); United States v. 69 Cases ... Southland Fountain Fruit,
89 F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Tenn. 1949), both involving products which resembled jam. Though
the products were accurately labeled, the respective courts held that they purported to
be the standardized jam or preserve by their appearance, and condemned them for failing
to comply with the standard.
65 504 F.2d at 781.
06 482 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1973).
671ld. at 583.
68 Id. at 586.
109345 F.2d 864 (3d Cir. 1965), modifying 226 F. Supp. 266, 276-77 (D.N.J. 1964), cert.
denied, 582 U.S. 918 (1965). In Vitasafe, unlike the Article of Food situation, no attempt
through labeling was made to reveal the nonessential character of the ingredients listed.
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essential ingredients falsely conveyed the impression that the inclusion
of such items enhanced the product's quality.
At least one circuit, however, has taken a more limited view of the
FDA's power. The Fifth Circuit has stated that the development of
sound nutritional practices is best left to consumer education and
should not be a matter subject to the enforcement procedures of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.70 However, this decision rested on the
failure of the FDA to provide sufficient information to support its al-
legations.7' This contrasts sharply with the substantial amount of
evidence supporting the need for a quantitative standard of identity
for dietary supplements.72
Despite the apparent propriety of the result in Nutritional Foods,
two areas of difficulty remain in the wake of the Second Circuit's deci-
sion. The guidelines enunciated by the court for a review of proposed
revisions in the maxima73 fail to account for a major source of consumer
ignorance. In its evaluation, the FDA is to consider, inter alia, the con-
sumer demand for a particular vitamin or mineral.74 Yet, demand for
any product may be created by the manufacturer's advertising. Thus,
if the advertising is sufficiently persuasive to create an "informed"
demand, the product might still be marketed though the FDA might
otherwise deem it nutritionally irrational. Secondly, the agency is
required to assess the dependability of a particular RDA when it eval-
uates future applications for changes in the maxima.75 However, con-
flicting expert opinion exists as to what constitutes sound nutrition.7 6
Thus, each new revision may generate renewed litigation.
It remains to be seen to what extent the FDA will actually limit
the variety of dietary supplements. In addition to the court-ordered
revisions, there has been congressional discontent over the zealousness
with which the agency attacked the nutrient problem.77 A proposed
See Goodrich, Food Standardization: Past, Present and Future, 24 FOOD DRUG CosM.
L.J. 464, 471-72 (1969), illustrating how consumers pay more for dietary supplements with
higher dosages, although the quality of such products is not any greater than those
meeting the U.S. RDA's.
70 United States v. 119 Cases of New Dextra Brand Fortified Cane Sugar, 34 F.2d
238 (5th Cir. 1964).
71 Id. at 238. See also Cream Wipt Food Prods. Co. v. Federal Security Administrator,
187 F.2d 789 (3d Cir. 1951), wherein the court invalidated a standard of identity upon
the Government's failure to prove allegations of deceptive nutritional labeling.
72 504 F.2d at 775-76.
73 See note 56 supra.
74 504 F.2d at 785.
75 Id. at 785-86.
76 See generally, 0. GARRISON, THE DIcrocATs' ATTACK ON HEALTH FOODS AND VITA-
MINS (1970); L. PAULING, VITAMIN C AND THE COMMON COLD (1970); WHITE HousE CoNrER-
ENCE ON FOOD, NUTRITION AND HEALTH, FINAL REP. (1969).
77 In his remarks before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Labor and Public
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amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act would prohibit the
FDA from issuing standards of identity which exclude noninjurious
combinations or potencies from dietary supplements." Although this
amendment was not passed in the last session, the FDA might take cog-
nizance of congressional sentiment and dilute the present standards.
Thus, while the Second Circuit has authorized the FDA to take strong
steps in regulating dietary supplements, whether the FDA can utilize
this tool effectively must await future developments.
Andrea Catania
Welfare Committee, Senator Proxmire, one of the 45 co-sponsors of an amendment to
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, expressed a common criticism of the supplement
regulations:
what skepticism, that reliance on common sense, that refusal to rubber stamp
the so-called experts who happen to occupy key or official positions, is one of the
great hallmarks of American democracy.... This is precisely why in the case of
vitamins, when the officially enthroned experts in the FDA are challenged by emi-
nent outside experts in a field as primitive and controversial and unsettled and
developing as vitamins and nutrition[,] [o]ne, it is desirable to view "official"
policy with skepticism, and, two, to leave as much freedom and discretion to pub-
lic choice as is not harmful to public health.
Hearings on S. 2801 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974).
See generally Murphy, Remarks Made at the Symposium on Food Standards, 24 FooD
DRuG Cosar. L.J. 390 (1969) (criticism of increased food controls); Comment, The Federal
Food Drug and Cosmetic Act as an Experiment in Quality Control, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv.
883 (1969) (thesis that standardization has led to concentration in the food industry).
78 S. 2801, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 410 (1973), reported in 119 CONG. REc. 22,579 (daily
ed. Dec. 12, 1973).
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